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Abstract; COVID-19 has exposed deep-rooted flaws in our health system regarding healthcare 
financing and delivery. This essay uses COVID-19 as a frame to reflect on the growth in our 
uninsured population, the flaws inherent in healthcare federalism, how “Trumpcare” has made 
things worse, the magnified importance of Medicaid, and the problems inherent in relying 
primarily on private actors.  
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 I. Introduction 
The COVID-19 pandemic has raised immensely important questions about the United States’ 
approach to public health and healthcare finance and delivery.
1
 These will be central to the post-
mortem studies that inevitably will follow the pandemic. While the disease is pathologically 
agnostic, it has exposed America’s deep economic and related racial inequalities. These are 
reflected by our healthcare system. However, at a more pedestrian or at least more finite level, 
the pandemic is highlighting and confirming deep-rooted flaws in our healthcare financing and 
delivery. This essay uses COVID-19 as a frame to reflect on the growth in our uninsured 
population, the flaws inherent in healthcare federalism, how “Trumpcare” has made things 
worse, the incredible importance of Medicaid, and the problems inherent in relying primarily on 
private actors. This is not an uplifting narrative but, hopefully will lead us to build a better 
system as we move forward.  
II. The Uninsured and Underinsured Problems are Bad and Getting Worse 
Although President Trump’s 2017 claim that “Obamacare is Dead”2 was plainly false, the 
argument that the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
3
 is “stuck in purgatory,” suffering from decade-
long injuries, and still under attack in Congress and before the courts is somewhat 
exaggerated
4—or would be but for the existential threat of Texas v. United States.5 The 
deficiencies in the ACA that have prompted the most attention during its first decade have been 
                                                 
1
 Ed Pilkington & Tom McCarthy, The missing six weeks: how Trump failed the biggest test of his life, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/mar/28/trump-coronavirus-politics-us-health-disaster.  
2
 Lauren Gambino, Trump claims 'Obamacare is dead' despite failure to repeal legislation, GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/16/donald-trump-obamacare-is-dead-affordable-care-act.  
3
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010). 
4
 Jonathan Oberlander, The Republican War on Obamacare - What Has It Achieved?, 379 N. ENGL. J. MED. 703 
(2018). 
5
 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted. 
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its failure to address treatment or prescription drug costs and the increasing problem of declining 
actuarial value in healthcare policies resulting in underinsurance,
6
 primarily for middle-income 
persons with insurance provided by their employers.
7
 Relatedly, our national health expenditures 
have resumed their upward trajectory and are estimated to represent almost 20 percent of the 
country’s gross domestic product before the end of the decade.8 
 
COVID-19 clearly increased focus on the underinsurance problem, with questions almost 
immediately voiced as to whether the insured would have to suffer out-of-pocket expenditures 
for testing, treatment, or hoped-for vaccination. As the pandemic has worsened, attention is once 
again returning to access to healthcare in the U.S. which still only merits an “Incomplete.” The 
cost and segmented nature of healthcare insurance remain the prevailing problems as persons 
churn from one insured (or uninsured) state to another, each with different premium and out-of-
pocket-costs (some of which are unaffordable) and networks, many of which are narrow enough 
to generate surprise bills. COVID-19 has emphasized the unfinished work of the ACA, including 
the need for additional legislation to better integrate marketplaces with Medicaid to provide a 
more seamless insurance system for all.  
 
                                                 
6
 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER T. ROBERTSON, EXPOSED: WHY OUR HEALTH INSURANCE IS INCOMPLETE AND WHAT CAN 
BE DONE ABOUT IT (2019). 
7
 Sherry A. Glied and Benjamin Zhu, Catastrophic Out-of-Pocket Health Care Costs: A Problem Mainly for Middle-
Income Americans with Employer Coverage (Commonwealth Fund, Apr. 2020). https://doi.org/10.26099/x0cx-
cp48.  
8
 Sean P. Keehan et al., National Health Expenditure Projections, 2019–28: Expected Rebound In Prices Drives 
Rising Spending Growth, 34 HEALTH AFF. (Mar. 24, 2020). 
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The number of uninsured remains far too high, approaching 30 million,
9
 higher than the 
combined populations of Australia and New Zealand. From a high at the time the ACA was 
passed, the uninsured rate rapidly declined, only to begin increasing again over the last three 
years.
10
 The Trump Administration’s lack of enthusiasm for the ACA marketplaces 
(“Obamacare”), the failure of some states to expand Medicaid, and the zeroing of the individual 
mandate penalty
11
 must all bear some of the blame. 
 
COVID-19 emphasizes the plight of the uninsured, such as those towards the bottom of the 
economic pyramid, those who are delivering our groceries and packages but are part-time 
employees without health insurance. One estimate suggests that hospitals treating the existing 
uninsured cohort will face uncompensated care in the range of $13.9 billion to $41.8 billion
12
 
with the high end of the estimate poised to consume over forty percent of funds set aside for 
hospitals by the CARES Act.
13
 
 
Even more critically, the increasing economic toll of the pandemic will lead to millions of 
Americans losing both their jobs and their employer-provided health insurance. There is little 
guarantee that all—or even many—of these jobs will return. One study found that the number of 
people receiving employment-based coverage has already declined by 1.5 million and projects a 
                                                 
9
 Jennifer Tolbert, Kendal Orgera, Natalie Singer & Anthony Damico, Key Facts about the Uninsured Population, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-
population/ (The estimate was 27.9 million in 2018). 
10
 Dylan Scott, The uninsured rate had been steadily declining for a decade. But now it’s rising again., VOX (Sep. 
10, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/10/20858938/health-insurance-census-bureau-data-
trump.  
11
 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081 (2017). 
12
 Larry Levitt, Karyn Schwartz & Eric Lopez, Estimated Cost of Treating the Uninsured Hospitalized with COVID-
19, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr 07, 2020), https://www.kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/estimated-cost-of-treating-the-
uninsured-hospitalized-with-covid-19/.  
13
 Karyn Schwartz & Tricia Neuman, A Look at the $100 Billion for Hospitals in the CARES Act, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-policy-watch/a-look-at-the-100-billion-for-hospitals-in-
the-cares-act/.  
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further decline of 7.3 million and several million family members.
14
 Another estimate suggests a 
range of 12 to 35 million, with particularly high rates in states that have not expanded 
Medicaid.
15
 
III. Healthcare Federalism is Overrated  
Much of the angst displayed in state and federal briefings on COVID-19 has reflected a 
disagreement over whether the President or state governors have the power to order or rescind 
“shelter-in-place” orders. That federalism question is answered in the states’ favor by the 10th 
Amendment. Healthcare federalism, on the other hand, is considerably harder to pin down 
particularly after the Affordable Care Act, reflecting layers of intergovernmental dynamics, 
negotiations, and agreements.
16
 Whatever this federalism is, it does not promote coherent or 
consistent policies or, from the perspective of the patient, much that is understandable. Rather, 
the healthcare federalism built on top of our federal system of government has resulted in a 
dizzying array of actors, sources of finance, and reimbursement models. As already noted, each 
of these segments so created feature different rules governing access, benefits, out-of-pocket 
expenses, and so on. 
 
According to Carl Ameringer, “The failure of the US government to construct a national health 
policy that reconciles diverse priorities means that there are no overriding principles to guide 
                                                 
14
 Woolhandler S, Himmelstein DU. Intersecting U.S. Epidemics: COVID-19 and Lack of Health Insurance. Ann 
Intern Med. 2020; [Epub ahead of print 7 April 2020]. doi: https://doi.org/10.7326/M20-1491. 
15
 HEALTH MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, COVID-19 IMPACT ON MEDICAID, MARKETPLACE, AND THE UNINSURED, BY 
STATE (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.healthmanagement.com/wp-content/uploads/HMA-Estimates-of-COVID-
Impact-on-Coverage-public-version-for-April-3-830-CT.pdf.  
16
 Gluck AR, Huberfeld N. What Is Federalism in Healthcare For? Stanford Law Rev. 2018;70(6):1689–1803. 
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health care delivery.”17 Of course, there is preemptive, centralized regulation of, for example, 
drugs and healthcare privacy and, obviously, CMS administers Medicare and dictates 
considerable Medicaid policy. Overall, however, modern healthcare federalism together with the 
dominant role of private entities goes beyond separating healthcare financing from its delivery 
and has led to an incoherent mix of financing models and reimbursement policies.  
 
During normal times, fiscal hawks frequently hold sway in Washington, seeking to reduce the 
federal healthcare financial footprint and threatening the most vulnerable with “reforms” such as 
work requirements and block grants.
18
 Outside of the norm, we see short term, additional funding 
during national emergencies such as the opioid overdose epidemic
19
 and, now, COVID-19.
20
  
Beyond these temporary occasions of generosity, the federal government has little enduring 
interest or ability in tackling major structural problems. For example, in a 2018 speech, HHS 
Secretary Azar recognized how little has been achieved in tackling the social determinants of 
health, highlighting the need to “do a better job of aligning federal health investments with our 
investments in non-healthcare needs.”21 Yet, he recognized that the structural impediments are 
massive; federal programs designed to help the vulnerable are spread across multiple agencies, 
frequently administered at the state level, and often are not even provided by government but 
depend on NGOs such as charities. 
                                                 
17
 CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, HEALTH CARE COSTS 101: A CONTINUING ECONOMIC THREAT 22 (May 
2018), https://www.chcf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/HealthCareCosts2018.pdf.  
18
 See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Medicaid and Opioids: From Promising Present to Perilous Future, TEMP. L. 
REV. at Parts III and IV (forthcoming 2020). 
19
 SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271 (2018). 
20
 E.g., Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-123 
(2020) and Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-136 (2020). 
21
 Alex M. Azar II, The Root of the Problem: America’s Social Determinants of Health, Hatch Foundation for 
Civility and Solutions (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/leadership/secretary/speeches/2018-
speeches/the-root-of-the-problem-americas-social-determinants-of-health.html.  
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While critics on the right like to refer to the ACA as a federal government takeover of healthcare, 
at most it was an expansion of health insurance regulation. Even given that limited frame, it was 
flawed because the shadow of ERISA continues to support regulatory fragmentation as states 
look to fill in the ACA’s gaps.22 
 
Perhaps, the failure of federalism (both healthcare and public health), aided in large part by the 
Supreme Court in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,23 is best illustrated by the patchwork 
expansion of Medicaid that, once again, emphasized that where Americans live is likely 
determinative of their access to healthcare. As COVID-19 has spread from the cities to already 
underserved rural counties, the failure of some states to issue timely stay-at-home orders began 
to coalesce with the problem of large numbers of uninsured persons.
24
 For too many, zip-code 
healthcare will morph into zip-code infection or mortality. To quote Nicole Huberfeld, “any 
assumption that states make better health choices is detached from history’s lessons.” 25 
 
Even in what is beyond doubt a national emergency, the federal government has eschewed its 
leadership role. Indeed, frequently, the rhetoric of favoring “surgical” interventions is code for 
pushing the decision down to states or even localities. Worse, the federal government seems to 
                                                 
22
 See generally Erin C. Fuse Brown & Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Federalism, ERISA, and State Single-Payer Health 
Care, 168 U. Penn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3395462  
23
 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012). 
24
 Molly Hennessy-Fiske & Jaweed Kaleem, Will Texas or Florida be ‘the next Italy’? Red states lag blue in stay-at-
home orders, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-03-23/coronavirus-
response-texas-florida-california-new-york?. 
25
 Nicole Huberfeld, Federalism in Health Care Reform, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET: FEDERALISM AND POVERTY 
197, 198 (Ezra Rosser ed., 2019). 
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favor a Darwinian competition among states for scarce resources
26
 or, worse, is blocking state 
access to some supplies.
27
 As Washington Governor Jay Inslee complained about the federal 
government portraying its role as that of a backup, "Can you imagine if Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt said, 'I'll be right behind you, Connecticut, good luck building those battleships’?"28 
IV. Even Congress Knows “Trumpcare” is a Disaster 
Although President Trump’s administration and his congressional allies expended considerable 
energy on the idea of ACA “repeal and replace,” the political reality of having to work within the 
budget reconciliation process left little room for “replace.”29 Thereafter, any plan the 
administration had would be executed through a combination of agency neglect and 
(de)regulation. Additionally, after the administration lost control of the House of Representatives 
(in no large part because the public had been warming to the ACA, particularly its ban on pre-
existing condition clauses), explicit repeal was seldom mentioned, replaced with the false 
narrative that “It’s dead. It’s gone. You shouldn’t even mention it. It’s gone. There is no such 
thing as Obamacare anymore.”30  
 
Thereafter, suspicions have been raised that the administration has been sabotaging the federal 
marketplace by reducing advertising and assistance to consumers, combined with system 
                                                 
26
 Nancy Cook & Dan Diamond, ‘A Darwinian approach to federalism’: States confront new reality under Trump, 
POLITICO (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/31/governors-trump-coronavirus-156875.  
27
 David Wallace-Wells, The White House Has Erected a Blockade Stopping States and Hospitals From Getting 
Coronavirus PPE, New York, Apr. 19, 2020, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/04/hospitals-face-a-white-house-
blockade-for-coronavirus-ppe.html. 
28
 Caroline Kelly, Washington governor slams Trump administration for comparing coronavirus' grim outlook to 
Pearl Harbor, WFSB (Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.wfsb.com/washington-governor-slams-trump-administration-for-
comparing-coronavirus-grim-outlook-to-pearl-harbor/article_1946a8fb-79c9-53f2-8235-9c737b66fa74.html. 
29
 Benjy Sarlin, What is 'Repeal and Replace?' A Guide to Trump's Health Care Buzzwords, NBC NEWS (Jan. 28, 
2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/what-repeal-replace-guide-trump-s-health-care-buzzwords-
n713366.  
30
 Gambino, supra note 2. 
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downtimes for “maintenance” during key enrollment periods.31 More explicitly (if not legally32), 
the administration ceased reimbursing insurers for the cost-sharing subsidies that the latter were 
obligated to pay to very low income marketplace customers, though the insurers got partial 
revenge by using what is known as “silver loading.”33 Sadly, the Trump administration has 
decided against reopening the individual marketplace during the pandemic to absorb some of the 
new uninsured.
34
 
 
The administration’s main thrust over the last two years has been to create “choice” by 
introducing cheaper alternatives to the ACA’s individual market metallic plans that, if popular, 
likely would also weaken the ACA risk pools. Thus, the administration has promoted “skinny” 
plans such as Short-Term, Limited-Duration Insurance (STLD) and Association Health Plans 
(AHPs). STLD plans as modified by the Trump administration may last far longer than permitted 
under the ACA, do not have to provide essential health benefits, and can impose annual or 
lifetime limits.
35
 AHPs predated the ACA and carry with them a dubious history of fraud and 
regulatory avoidance. Although a minor exception in the ACA permitted AHPs created by small 
businesses with common interests, the Trump Administration removed most of the limitations,
36
 
again allowing for policies that do not provide essential health benefits. Some states have already 
                                                 
31
 Peter Sullivan, Trump officials plan maintenance downtime for healthcare.gov during ObamaCare sign-ups, THE 
HILL (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.thehill.com/policy/healthcare/410574-trump-officials-plan-maintenance-
downtime-for-healthcaregov-during.  
32
 See generally Katie Keith, Latest Ruling Over Unpaid CSRs, HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 25, 2019), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20191025.570658/full/.  
33
 See generally Stan Dorn, Silver Linings For Silver Loading, HEALTH AFF. (Jun. 3, 2019), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190530.156427/full/.  
34
 Margot Sanger-Katz & Reed Abelson, Obamacare Markets Will Not Reopen, Trump Decides, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/upshot/obamacare-markets-coronavirus-trump.html.  
35
 Short-Term, Limited-Duration Insurance, 83 Fed. Reg. 38,212 (Aug. 3, 2018). 
36
 Definition of ‘‘Employer’’ Under Section 3(5) of ERISA—Association Health Plans, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,912 (June 
6, 2018). 
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moved to outlaw skinny plans
37
 and the federal rule is being challenged in the courts.
38
 There is 
also a dearth of data as to exactly what coverages skinny plans offer given the absence of 
essential health benefit or preexisting condition requirements.
39
 There should be real concern that 
persons who were coaxed into buying these plans by the Trump Administration will now find 
themselves holding almost worthless policies when gauged against the likely costs of COVID-19 
treatment beyond the initial testing.  
 
The administration also continued to promote the Bush Administration model of HSAs combined 
with high deductible catastrophic plans. Finally, although it did not necessarily cause the 
problem of rapidly increasing out-of-pocket expenses and the attendant rise in the number of 
underinsured persons,
40
 clearly the administration has done nothing to solve it. 
 
As COVID-19 developed, Congress passed bipartisan legislation that implicitly ridicules some of 
these elements of “Trumpcare.” Thus, Section 6001 of the Families First Coronavirus Response 
Act requires that group, individual and grandfathered plans must provide coverage without cost-
sharing for COVID-19 testing.
41
 However, STLD plans are not included, thus rendering their 
                                                 
37
 See, e.g., B. 1001, 22nd Council, Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2019) (defining short-term plans as nonrenewable & limited to 
3 months); S.B. 1375, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2018) (bars individuals from AHPs plans; bill author described 
plans as “junk insurance”). Cf. S.B. 322, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2019) (specifically allows STLDs and AHPs). 
38
 New York v. US Dep’t of Labor, 363 F.Supp. 3d 109 (D.D.C. 2019) (rejecting the department’s interpretation of 
ERISA and AHPs) app. filed, Apr. 30, 2019). 
39
 Dania Palanker & Christina L. Goe, States Don’t Know What’s Happening in Their Short-Term Health Plan 
Markets and That’s a Problem, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2020/states-dont-know-whats-happening-their-short-term-health-plan-
markets-and-thats-problem. 
40
 Underinsured Rate Rose From 2014-2018, With Greatest Growth Among People in Employer Health Plans, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/press-release/2019/underinsured-rate-
rose-2014-2018-greatest-growth-among-people-employer-health.  
41
 Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127 (2020). 
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members as uninsured and eligible for Medicaid coverage of the testing.
42
 Essentially, Congress 
announced that buying a skinny plan promoted by the administration was equivalent to being 
uninsured. As for high-deductible catastrophic plans, they too have had to be rethought in the 
light of the pandemic, and the IRS has advised that the plans can pay for COVID-19-related 
testing and treatment without jeopardizing their status.
43
 
 
As has been the case since the 2016 election, there is always a “new” Trumpcare plan around the 
corner. In late March 2020, the President hinted that he might use Medicare and Medicaid to 
cover the increased uninsured rate caused by the pandemic, saying “I'm not committing, I have to 
get approval. I've got a thing called Congress. It's something to look at and we have been 
looking.” 44 However, it has been reported that such a plan is unpopular within the administration 
because it could undercut its political and legal positioning with regard to the Texas v. U.S. 
litigation.
45
 
V. Medicaid Has Never Been More Important  
The 2017 repeal-and-replace arguments, particularly in the Senate, rotated around the most 
unpopular aspects of the ACA, such as the individual mandate. However, in the House of 
Representatives, then-Speaker Ryan was pursuing a parallel agenda: not just repealing Medicaid 
expansion but converting traditional Medicaid to a block grant program.
46
 Although that effort 
                                                 
42
 Id. at § 6004. 
43
 IRS: High-deductible health plans can cover coronavirus costs, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Mar. 11, 2020), 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-high-deductible-health-plans-can-cover-coronavirus-costs. 
44
 Susannah Luthi, Trump hints at using federal programs to provide coverage after Obamacare decision, POLITICO 
(Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/01/trump-obamacare-coronavirus-160732. 
45
 Id.  
46
 See, e.g., Shefali Luthra , Everything You Need To Know About Block Grants — The Heart Of GOP’s Medicaid 
Plans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 24, 2017), https://khn.org/news/block-grants-medicaid-faq/.  
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failed, the Trump Administration’s CMS adopted a related agenda, also designed to reduce the 
Medicaid budget, but by reducing the number of eligible persons. This “work requirement” 
strategy, which was, at its philosophical core, an attempt to reframe Medicaid as welfare rather 
than health insurance, was to be implemented by approving Section 1115 waiver requests from 
states.
47
 As is well-known, the administration’s plans were put on ice by a combination of the 
shocking results in Arkansas, where 18,000 persons lost eligibility in six months, and legal 
challenges that culminated in a robust rejection of the program by the DC Circuit Court of 
Appeals.
48
 With work requirements likely off the table, CMS turned to block grants, albeit after 
rebranding the initiative as a “Healthy Adult Opportunity.”49 
 
It is Medicaid 101 that a recession, let alone one caused by an almost total shut down of 
economic life and vastly increased unemployment, will, in true counter-cyclical fashion, trigger 
increased demand for Medicaid, while state revenues decline.
50
 However, COVID-19 provides 
further evidence that, in national health emergencies, Medicaid is an incredibly important initial 
response. For example, after Hurricane Katrina, the Bush administration removed the eligibility 
requirements for Medicaid benefits.
51
 Medicaid was also a major part of the federal 
government’s response to the opioid overdose epidemic.52 
 
                                                 
47
 Letter from Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., & Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for 
Medicare and Medicaid Servs., to U.S. State Governors 1–2 (Mar. 14, 2017), 
http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/secpriceadminvermaltr.pdf.  
48
 Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
49
 Letter from Calder Lynch, Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Directors (Jan. 30, 
2020), http://www.medicaid.gov/sites/default/files/FederalPolicyGuidance/Downloads/smd20001.pdf. 
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The same has been true with COVID-19. Although CMS has resisted calls to follow the Bush 
model and liberalize eligibility, it has granted a large number of Section 1135 waivers that, for 
example, suspend prior authorization requirements or relax provider enrollment rules.
53
 CMS has 
also begun approving Section 1115 waivers targeting specific COVID-19 needs.
54
 The Families 
First Coronavirus Response Act provided COVID-19 testing for Medicaid recipients without 
cost-sharing
55
 and introduced a temporary 6.2 percent increase in the FMAP, the federal 
government’s contribution to Medicaid.56 
 
As if more evidence was needed, the pandemic has demonstrated the vital role that Medicaid 
plays in providing not only health care but also health resilience, normalizing access to 
services.
57
 As already noted and doubling down on the cruel natural experiment
58
 that was 
triggered by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,59 some non-expansion states also have 
governors who refused or delayed stay-at-home orders.
60
  
 
Medicaid provides another major role particularly in poor or rural areas. While reimbursement 
rates are not high, they are often what keeps rural hospitals afloat. One hundred and twenty rural 
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CMS (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-approves-medicaid-section-1135-
waivers-11-additional-states-response-covid-19 .  
54
 CMS letter to Washington State Medicaid Director, April 21, 2020, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/section-
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hospitals have closed in the last decade, disproportionally in non-expansion states.
61
 Those that 
remain face existential challenges because of COVID-19 as their income from elective surgeries, 
physical therapy, and laboratory tests have all but disappeared.
62
 Laggard states adopting 
Medicaid expansion and increased Medicaid funding will be critical factors in providing 
healthcare over the next few years. The Surgeon General’s 2016 report on addictions concluded 
that “Medicaid expansion is a key lever for expanding access to substance use treatment because 
many of the most vulnerable individuals with substance use disorders have incomes below 138% 
of the federal poverty level.”63 The same will be true during and after the current pandemic; as 
the vulnerable, poor, and persons of color suffer disproportionately, the program that benefits 
those groups the most must be strengthened.
64
 
 
Moneys provided under CARES Act are being distributed by CMS to hospitals in aid to 
compensate them for losses caused by the postponement of elective surgeries. However, more is 
needed. As urged by America’s Health Insurance Plans and the Blue Cross Blue Shield 
Association, Congress should expand Medicaid to cover treatment in addition to testing and 
ensure that federal funds extend that coverage to the uninsured.
65
 Those who fully understand the 
role that Medicaid plays in good times, and, particularly, in bad, have proposed reintroducing the 
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64
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original ACA 100 percent enhanced match for three years to bring those holdout states into the 
fold.
66
 Massive increases in the numbers of unemployed and uninsured will cement Medicaid as 
the most important healthcare insurance in the country and, hopefully, will reduce calls from the 
right for its dismemberment. 
VI. The Private Sector is Overrated  
The daily dueling televised briefings by the Trump administration and the nation’s governors 
may have reflected disagreements over federal and state powers and responsibilities.
67
 Under the 
surface, however, they also illustrate the fundamental fragility of a healthcare system that, some 
financing and regulation aside, is fundamentally one implemented by private actors interacting in 
a poorly functioning market model. 
 
Those who tout the excellence of the U.S. healthcare, damning evidence to the contrary 
notwithstanding,
68
 frequently look to markets and competition as the keys to innovation, cost 
reduction, and improved quality.
69
 However, private healthcare entities (be they non-profits or 
for-profits) lack incentives to address the social determinants of health, to build community 
resilience, to construct wraparound service, or to invest in healthcare solidarity to achieve herd-
based improvements to the health of all. 
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Of course, there are regulatory “nudges,” such as the ACA’s Hospital Readmissions Reduction 
Program
70
 and the requirement that non-profit hospitals perform community health needs 
assessments.
71
 However, these seem to have had little impact on our deep structural problems. 
These are problems that require centralized intervention and are not issues addressable by the 
private actors in our deeply fragmented healthcare system or, as argued above, most of our states. 
Take, for example, rural populations, which continue to see their healthcare needs rise while 
their hospital and provider resources are hollowed out.
72
 Medicaid expansion
73
 and DSH 
payments
74
 help, but only centralized government can sustain a comprehensive rural healthcare 
system.  
 
COVID-19 not only illustrates how private actors failed to invest in prophylactic structures but 
also their relatively poor performance once the pandemic arrived. For example, stories have 
emerged of chaotic responses by for-profit private healthcare systems that were reducing 
supplies and overworking staff even before the virus hit.
75
 Reliance on diffuse private entities 
who are also competitors is also responsible for much of the fragmentation in our healthcare 
system. As the situation in New York worsened in March 2020, Governor Cuomo announced a 
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statewide public-private hospital plan to fight COVID-19. This essentially merged the 200 
entities, allowing them to share supplies and staff and balance capacity.
76
 
 
The negatives inherent in the U.S. private system extend beyond delivery to financing. For 
example, when a system is designed around third-party reimbursement, it may have to shutter 
and furlough staff during a national emergency—a peculiar irony as hospital staff are let go 
during a time when our healthcare resources are overwhelmed.
77
 Equally, the friction caused by 
the interaction of private insurance companies and providers is brought into stark relief during a 
pandemic, when quick responses; innovation in delivery, such as using tele-health; and speedy 
authorization are missing.
78
 COVID-19 has magnified the dysfunction inherent in the public-
private model, such as when vindictive politicians instruct suppliers not to send needed supplies 
to a particular state.
79
 
 
Needless to say, generalizations are never perfect. A public, top-down, integrated system also 
will falter in the face of a pandemic if the chosen strategy is flawed, as has been the case in the 
United Kingdom.
80
 However, in general, Western democracies have favored less reliance on 
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private healthcare during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the public health systems in 
Ireland
81
 and Spain
82
 took over private providers for the duration of the pandemic. 
 
If there is one overarching lesson to be learned from COVID-19, it is that the country’s 
investments in clinical care versus public health must be recalibrated. The inevitable barrier to 
that reform will be private healthcare’s lobbyists who will argue for increased reimbursement for 
providers rather than channeling resources to social determinants, surveillance, and preventive 
care. 
VII. Conclusion 
History likely will record the COVID-19 pandemic as a once-in-a century disaster, but that 
should not absolve the U.S. healthcare system from blame. The last few decades have provided 
multiple previews of the system’s deficiencies and structural weaknesses that render it even less 
able to sustain a crisis: from Hurricane Katrina in 2005, to H1N1 in 2009, to the Ebola virus in 
2014, and the height of the opioid overdose epidemic beginning in 2011. Some will argue that 
the loss of life seen in Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom prove that a universal-coverage, 
single-payer system is not necessarily the solution for the United States.
83
 More thoughtful 
analysis will conclude, however, that the pandemic exposed the deep flaws in our healthcare 
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system,
84
 flaws that flow from a healthcare financing system that reflects individualism rather 
than solidarity. Those flaws were tragically encapsulated in a story related by a nurse anesthetist 
in New York City who memorialized the dying words of one of his COVID-19 patients as he 
was placed on a ventilator: “Who's going to pay for it?”85 
                                                 
84
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